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Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in
Islamic Finance
Haider Ala Hamoudi*

I. INTRODUCTION
My father is a medical doctor living in Ohio, nearly seventy years of age
with sufficient savings accumulated during decades of professional practice to
enable him to live comfortably. He is also a devout Muslim. He prays five times
every day, fasts one month of the year, and has made the mandated pilgrimage
to Mecca not once, but twice. In many ways, therefore, my father is almost the
paradigmatic example of a person who might be interested in investing his
money in institutions and instruments that are deemed to be compliant with
Islamic rules. In asking why Islamic banks have such difficulty attracting him
and others like him as potential clients,1 I intend to shed light on the central
existential problem facing Islamic finance. Specifically, Islamic finance has failed
to achieve its articulated, functional goal of an alternative system of commerce
based on notions of fairness and social justice.
The reasons for this functional failure are the means by which the
constituent rules of Islamic finance are derived; that is, the use of an interpretive
system that, at least in its contemporary manifestation, is a type of rather
extreme quasi-scientific, logic-driven formalism. Proponents of Islamic finance
tend to divorce the problem of means from that of ends, pretending that with
sufficient creativity and ingenuity, the formalist hermeneutic will permit the
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realization of the functional ends they endlessly promote.2 Lon Fuller has
criticized similar approaches in the development of social order, indicating that
unless means and ends are considered in relation to one another, the architecture
of social order cannot be sensibly conceived.' Fuller's analogy is to physical
architecture, where an architect cannot divorce her ultimate ends of utility and
beauty from the means she employs to achieve them. A building suspended in
mid-air, for example, might serve the conceptual ends of an architect, but there
are no real means by which it might be built.'
This lesson appears lost on Islam's contemporary formalists in the context
of finance, who appear uninterested in either defining their practice as mere
formal compliance with doctrine or developing functional hermeneutical means
to attain the functional goals they articulate. Rather, there is something akin to
schizophrenia in the Islamic financial community, where formalist means have
led to formalist ends, which proponents describe as functional, alternatively
engaging in obfuscation, self-serving cant or incoherence in their defense.
There are only two ways to unravel this Gordian knot. Either Islam's
interpretive modalities require adjustment to achieve the articulated functional
ends, or the proponents of the system will ultimately have to acknowledge that,
from a functional perspective, Islamic banks operate on the same basic financial
and economic bases as their conventional counterparts and that the differences
between the two are entirely formal in nature. I find the latter neither desirable
nor sustainable for a variety of reasons that will be explored in this Article. As a
result, I advocate the development of realizable and principled functional
interpretive approaches to achieve the primary functional goals of an Islamic
financial institution.
This Article is divided into three parts, excluding this Introduction. In part
II, I briefly discuss the contemporary practice of Islamic finance and the
interpretive principles that gave rise to it. Part III explains precisely why, from
the standpoint of potential investors such as my father, this practice is deeply,
ontologically flawed. Part IV sets forth another model of an Islamic financial
institution, based on functional approaches to the jurisprudence, and explains
the benefits provided by such an institution.
At the outset, however, given the extent to which I use them in this Article,
definitional clarifications of the terms "formalism" and "functionalism" are

2

See Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Bank Cotporate Governance and Regulation:A CallforMutuaiZation
4-5 (Sept 2005), available online at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/IBCGR.pdf>
(visited Jan 15, 2007).
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Lon L. Fuller, Means and Ends, in Kenneth I. Winston, ed, The Principles of Social Order: Selected
Essays ofLon L Fuller47 (Duke 1981).
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necessary. In using the term "formalism," I am referring to an interpretive
methodology relying almost entirely on logic (and excluding more contextual
and experientially based techniques) to derive clear and specific rules whose
application in particular factual contexts is non-controversial, without regard to
whether those rules serve any particular end. There are other types of formalism,
including the neo-formalism that characterizes the jurisprudence of Justice
Scalia.' Justice Scalia's conception of formalism, however, presumes the
continuing presence of an elected legislature that enacts and amends the rules
that govern the legal system. This framework is completely absent in the Islamic
context, where rules are based on past Revelation. A more apt comparison
for
6
Langdellianism.
nineteenth-century
to
be
would
Islamic orthodoxy
"Functionalism" refers to the methodology whereby rules are purposefully
derived to achieve particular ends that relate to preferred modalities and
institutions of human association. These rules necessarily involve an interpretive
approach that is contextual, discretionary, and experiential rather than logicdriven, uniform, and certain. The terms "functional ends" and "functional goals"
merely refer to the ends that functionalism seeks to achieve.
Under these definitions, a rule that serves no end other than to obey the
will of God in some ethereal sense does not concern modalities or institutions of
human association and is therefore not "functional." Moreover, the design of
the rule to serve the end must be purposeful and intentional to be functional.
Mary Douglas, for example, suggests that dietary rules that appear to have no
function often result in a strengthening of communal bonds. While this may be
an incidental effect of the rule, and while the effect may result in its
perpetuation, it would be fair to say that the dietary rules are not purposefully
sustained to achieve this end and therefore are not by this definition exercises in
"functionalism."
II.

FORMALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCE
A. ORTHODOX INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES

In order to discuss formalism within Islamic finance competently, a brief
introduction to the mechanics of the contemporary Islamic interpretive system is
necessary. The primary materials from which law is derived pursuant to
contemporary Islamic orthodoxy are, in addition to the relatively few verses of
5
6

Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Intetpretadon: FederalCourts and the Law (Princeton 1997).
See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad's SodalJustice or Muslim Cant: Langdellianism and the Failuresof
Islamic Finance,40 Cornell Ind L J (forthcoming 2007).
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the Qur'an containing legal content,8 the utterances or examples of Muhammad
known as hadith. These utterances or examples are expanded and clarified
through a form of primarily analogical reasoning known as qiyas to develop sets
of broad rules.1 0 Any consensus among jurists as to the proper application of
qiyas in any particular context sanctifies that application as per se valid and
binding through use of a source of law known as #ma, or consensus. 11 The
Qur'an, the hadith, qiyas, and b/ma constitute the four primary sources of law in
the Sunni Islamic tradition. 12 Other doctrines such as istibsan, a form of equity,
and istislah, or public interest, exist, but they are disputed and in any event are of
13
minor importance in developing the jurisprudence.
What is most striking about this list, and particularly the primary items, is
the extent to which it purports to develop rules with almost no concern for their
functional value. Revelation, either in the form of the Qur'an or the hadith, or the
extension of that Revelation through qiyas and jima, is not only the wellspring of
the rules, but also the chief determinant of their precise contours and
parameters. Thus, Islamic interpretive theory, like Langdell's scientific approach
to the development of jurisprudence, seems to find considerations of public
policy or interest irrelevant.14
This is not to say that it is impossible to develop functional rules in spite of
the seeming formalism of the interpretive system. One prominent authority has
indicated that in some areas of law, such as criminal law, rules were developed
functionally in the classical era even if they are often rigid in contemporary

8

See Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Lessons in IslamicJurisprudenceI (Oxford 2003).

9

Cherif Bassiouni and Gamal Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J
Islamic & Near E L 135, 138-39 (2002).
Badran Abu al-Aynayn Badran, Usul al-Fiqh (The Prncip/es ofJurisrudence) 229 (Dar al-Ma'arif 2d ed

10

1965).
11

Id at 200.

12

Id at 286. See also Hossein Modarressi Tabataba'i, An Introdction to Shi'i Law: A Bibliographical

13

14

Study 3 nn 1, 4 (Ithaca 1984). Shi'i Islam has the same four sources, but substitutes in the place of
q yas the doctrine of 'aqi, which denotes similar logic-driven reasoning not necessarily analogical in
nature. A paradigmatic example of 'aqlis the "rule of correlation" (qaidatalmulaZama), pursuant to
which, among other things, the prerequisites of an obligatory act are deemed obligatory and the
direct opposite of an obligatory act is deemed prohibited.
Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Usul Al-Fiqh 251, 281-83 (Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi 1969). See also
Bassiouni and Badr, 1 UCLA J Islamic & Near E L at 138-59 (cited in note 9) (describing other
potential sources of law within Islamic jurisprudence).
For Langdell's famous expression of disdain for public concern in the context of the "mailbox
rule," see C.C. Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts 20-21 (Boston, Little, Brown 2d ed
1880).
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application."5 Another commentator has shown certain jurists were willing to
ignore the interpretive system in "deriving" rules from it in the classical era. 6 At
least one classical jurist apparently liberated his jurisprudential ideas from vast
numbers of hadith by suggesting that they could be ignored to serve social
interests that were more in harmony with predefined, broad legal objectives. 7
Ibn Taymiyah, a prominent fourteenth-century jurist whose writings have
influenced some of the most conservative Islamic movements currently in
existence, seems to have disregarded a restriction on stipulations in contracts in
order to advocate a more liberal commercial regime. 8 One recent commentator
has written thoughtfully and extensively about siyasa shar'fya-a Sunni doctrine
developed by Ibn Taymiyah and his disciple Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya that
identifies purposes of Islamic jurisprudence and therefore presupposes a high
level of functionalism.' 9
It suffices to say, however, that in the context of contemporary
jurisprudence, none of these or any other potential liberalizing approaches
would be acknowledged as permissible means of deriving rules within the
hermeneutic. Today, no traditionalist Islamic scholar could credibly write rules
without explaining their precise basis under orthodox Islamic jurisprudential
principles. Certainly no traditionalist scholar interested in preserving his
reputation would openly and obviously disregard contrary hadith or previously
reached i/ma in fashioning rules, nor would he suggest some hadith were not
binding. One modern prominent Shi'i scholar who made precisely such an
argument was sharply criticized for promulgating heresy.2"

15

16

17

18

19

20

See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed, The Islamic CriminalJustice System
xvii (Oceana 1982); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights in
the Islamic CriminalJustice System, in Bassiouni, ed, Islamic CriminalJustice 3, 5 (cited in note 15).
See Mohammad Fadel, 'Istihsan is Nine-Tenths of the Law": The Puzzling Relationship of Usul to Furu'
in the Maliki Madhhab, in Bernard Weiss, ed, Studies in IslamicLegal Theog 161-76 (Brill 2002).
Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The ConstitutionalJuriprudence of Shihab Al-Din AlQarafi59, 62 (Brill 1996).
Specifically, Ibn Taymiyah adopts a highly permissive theory of stipulations in contracts,
indicating that the only stipulations to be prohibited are those that violate the contract itself or
Islamic law generally. See Ibn Taymiyah, 6 al-Fatawa l-Kubra 408 et seq (Dar al-Qalam 1987); Ibn
Taymiyah, NaZariyat al-Aqd (Opinions on the Law of Contrac0 14-16 (Beirut: Dar Al Ma'rifa 1978).
This clearly is contrary to the terms of a hadith accepted by the Hanbali school of thought to
which Ibn Taymiyah adheres, and reported by Ibn Hanbal itself, prohibiting two stipulations in
any given contract. Ibn Qudamah, 6 al-Mughni 321-22 (Cairo: Imblbah 1986).
Clark B. Lombardi, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incotporation of the Shari'a into
Egyptian ConstitutionalLaw 49-53 (Brill 2006).
See Chibli Mallat, The Renewal of Islamic Law 143 (Cambridge 1993) (describing reaction to
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's Iqtisaduna).
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As a result, and without prejudice to the jurisprudence that may have
existed in the classical era, Islam's interpretive orthodox system is in
contemporary application rigid, quasi-scientific, and dependent on excessively
formal exercises of logic. It is also highly suspicious of contextual, discretionary,
and experiential interpretive approaches that do not result in the type of
jurisprudential uniformity and certainty that formalism is meant to ensure. It is
precisely this perspective that has led jurists in the modern era to determine that
the Qur'anic prohibition on an activity known as riba necessarily encompasses
the taking of interest on a money loan.2' The Qur'an itself is entirely unclear on
the definition of riba. The Qur'an forbids niba and denounces it as exploitative
and unfair, akin to theft, the opposite of charity, and responsible for generating
unnaturally high levels of return, but otherwise provides little guidance
respecting the elements of the forbidden practice.22 One of the principal hadith
on the subject refers exclusively to a particular exploitative practice in
Muhammad's time, wherein a creditor agrees to a deferral in the repayment of a
loan on its due date in exchange for a significant increase in the value of the
loan, hence the Qur'anic reference to "doubling and redoubling., 23 The hadith
indicates that this practice is the only form of riba.24
However, a second hadith prohibits uneven or delayed trades of particular
items-basically precious metals and simple foodstuffs. 25 This hadith was
expanded through qiyas to encompass items of various sorts in the classical era
and extended ultimately in the modern era to forms of currency that have little
to do with precious metals or foodstuffs. According to proponents of Islamic
finance, this conclusion was consecrated through !/ma, thereby rendering any
other interpretation fundamentally illegitimate.26
21

El-Gamal, Islamic Bank at 2 (cited in note 2).

22

See Qur'an 2:275; 4:161 (promising a "painful punishment" for those who take riba and those

24

who devour the property of others falsely); Qur'an 3:130 ("O you who believe, devour not niba,
making it double and redouble"); Qur'an 30:39 ("And whatever you lay out as niba, so that it may
increase in the property of men, it shall not increase with Allah; and whatever you give in charity,
desiring Allah's pleasure, you shall get manifold.").
Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, Ii, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return 72-73
(Kluwer 1998); S.E. Rayner, The Theory of Contractsin Islamic Law 269 (Graham & Trotman 1991);
"Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad Sanhuri, 3 MasadirAl-Haqqfial-FiqhAl-Islami, DirasaMuqarinama' al-Fiqh
al-gharbi (The Sources of Truth in Islamic Jurisprudence:A Comparative Studj with Western Jurisprudence)
241 (al-Qahira 1967).
Sanhuri, 3 MasadirA/-Haqqfial-FiqhAI-Islami at 241 (cited in note 23).

25

Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance at 74 (cited in note 23).

26

See Muhammad Uzair, The Impact of Interest Free Banking, 3 J Islamic Banking & Fin 39, 40 (1984)

23

(describing the exemption of interest from the tiba prohibition to be "apologetics"); Muhammad
Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance iii (Idaratul Ma'arif 2d ed 1998) (describing similar
position as "defeatist"). See also Council of Islamic Ideology, Consolidated Recommendations on the
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An alternative functional approach that accepts the earlier, narrower hadith
and uses it either to limit or abrogate the latter hadith is possible. The great Arab
jurist Abdul Razzaq Al-Sanhuri advocated something along these lines, thereby
rendering the interest prohibition a nullity in the contemporary era.27 Using
antiformalist tools such as istislah and istihsan, functionalists might take an
additional step and expand this earlier hadith to propose a doctrine on riba that
would meet the functional objectives articulated in the Qur'an-namely,
avoidance of exploitation or oppression resulting in unnatural gains to the
stronger party. Specific rules could be developed to define such practices and
ensure that they are based on core Qur'an and hadith prohibitions.
However, rather than developing rules to serve the doctrine functionally,
the contemporary hermeneutic prefers a logic-driven formal ban that, while
uniform and clear, serves no end. The empty formalism of the riba rule cannot
be understated; a trade, for example, of one automobile for a more valuable one
to be delivered at a later date does not fall within the prohibition. The
prohibition relates only to particular items, most importantly for our purposes,
money.
Similarly, the Islamic prohibition ofgharar,or certain forms of commercial
risk, has developed from a vague Qur'anic principle banning games of chance
and from a series of Prophetic hadith forbidding speculative activities such as the
sale of fish in the sea. 8 Qiyas and subsequent i/ma rendered this into a
prohibition of astonishing breadth that basically invalidated any contract with a
fundamentally high level of uncertainty, including uncertainties over price and
duration. 9 A fortiori, an insurance contract, where not only the duration, but
indeed the very existence of a payout was in question, was declared invalid.
Ironically, the formal requirement against this sort of "risk" not only failed to
serve the original function of avoiding games of chance, but also undermined
that very purpose because it required the believer to "gamble" his entire business
by failing to take insurance to protect himself against foreseeable harms. Again, a
functional alternative would be to take the specific practices banned by the
Qur'an and the hadith and expand them using a combination of qgyas, istihsan, and
istislah to develop rules to meet the objectives set forth in the Qur'an.

27

Islamic Economic System 7 (Govt of Pakistan 1983) (indicating the presence of "complete unanimity
among all schools of thought in Islam that the term riba stands for interest in all its types and
forms").
Sanhuri, 3 MasadirAl-Haqqfial-Fiqh Al-Islami at 219-49 (cited in note 23).

28

Id at 231.

29

Id at 249.
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B. ARTIFICE AND ISLAMIC FINANCE-ON THE MATTERS OF
THE SYNTHETIC MURABAHA AND TAKAFUL

Needless to say, the formal restrictions against nba and ghararas developed
under the orthodox principles make the practice of Islamic finance
extraordinarily challenging. The theoretical solution has been to structure the
financial institutions under a form of partnership known as a mudharaba, which
operates much like a mutual fund or a private equity fund. Passive investors
place their money in a broader institution that purchases and sells assets and
distributes profits between itself and the investors based on an agreed
percentage.30 Manifold problems with this approach have rendered it entirely
infeasible, however.3'
The industry therefore fell back on artifice and stratagem to circumvent the
nba and gharar prohibitions on the barest technical grounds. I provide two
central examples. The first, murabaha, is by an overwhelming margin the primary
investment vehicle of Islamic financial institutions, and the second, takaful, is a
rapidly growing segment of the Islamic financial market.
The murabahais a form of short-term financing permitted by proponents of
Islamic finance wherein the financial institution agrees to purchase an item on
behalf of a client and then sell it to the client on the basis of an agreed markup,
with payment usually coming at a later time.33 While the murabaha seems
harmless, it can easily be manipulated to function for all intents and purposes as
an interest-based transaction which would otherwise be banned under the
doctrine of nba. For example, an Islamic financial institution could not simply
lend $1000 to a borrower. Under the murabaha exception, however, it could
purchase $1000 of copper at its market value, immediately sell the copper to a
buyer, with the buyer promising to pay for it at a higher price on a later date. In
this example, I will assume that the buyer promises to pay $1100 in one year's
time. As part of the same murabaha transaction, in a procedure known as
tawarruq,34 the bank may also arrange for the buyer to immediately sell the
copper back into the commodities market for the same $1000. No party will
have ever taken possession of the copper they "owned" for a fraction of a

30

31
32
33
34

Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance at 109-10 (cited in note 23); Hamoudi, 40 Cornell Intl L
J at n 7 (cited at note 6).
See Hamoudi, 40 Cornell Int LJ (cited at note 6).
Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the GlobalEconomy 133 (Edinburgh 2001).
El-Gamal, Limits andDangers at 4 (cited in note 1).
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Mutualiy as an Anidote to Rent-Seeking Shari'a-Arbitragein Islamic Finance
10-11, available online at <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/Mutuality.pdf> (visited Jan
15, 2007) (hereinafter "Arbitrage").
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second.35 The result will be that the copper will have been bought and sold back
into the market, and what remains after the near simultaneous set of transactions
is $1000 in the possession of the buyer, and a promise on the buyer's part to pay
the bank $1100 in one year's time. The $100 "mark-up" is effectively an interest
rate, and the bank can structure its transactions so that the "mark-up" in any
given transaction reflects precisely the prevailing market fixed interest rate. 36 By
one commentator's recent estimate, between 80 and 90 percent of the
3"
investments of Islamic financial institutions take the form of the murabaha.
However, it also seems reasonably clear that no formal rule is broken in the
synthetic murabaha. The Islamic financial institution charges no interest in the
sense of lending money in exchange for more money to be received at a later
date. Instead, goods were bought from a third party and then resold to the
"borrower," a perfectly acceptable Islamic practice under the formalist
hermeneutic.
By contrast, the stratagem used to circumvent the rules of ghararin the case
of insurance is problematic even from a formal perspective. Takaful derives from
the determination by some scholars that gratuitous contracts are exempt from
38 Pursuant to takaful, a group of Muslims agrees to protect
the rules of gharar.
one another in the case of casualty or loss by pooling their resources through
making regular payments in the form of premiums to be invested in commercial
products deemed permissible under the rules of Islamic finance. 39 The scheme
functions in theory as an Islamic financial institution would, with "profits"
shared among the beneficiaries and the providers. 4 When a casualty or loss
occurs, the participants each "gift" a portion of the premiums already collected
(as well as any undistributed profits) to the bearer of the loss.41 Aside from its
creative labels, there is little that distinguishes takaful from more conventional
forms of insurance.

35
36

37
38
39

Id at 9.
The above example, a mimicking of a fixed interest rate, is by far the most simple. Other, more
complex examples abound with respect to more sophisticated transactions, among them a loan
with a varying interest rate. See Hamoudi, 40 Cornell Ind LJ (cited at note 6).
Vogel and Hayes, IslamicLaw and Financeat 198 (cited in note 23).
Id at 151. For a classical reference, see Ibn Rushd, Bidayat AI-Mujtahid 2:361 (al-Quahirah 1970)
(stating that "all which cannot be sold legitimately from the standpoint ofgbarar[may be gifted]").
Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Financeat 151-52 (cited in note 23).

40

Ma'sum Billah Mohd, Princdies & Pracices of Takaaful and Insurance Compared 25 (Intl Islamic U
2001).

41

Id.
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III. THE PITFALLS OF FORMALISM

A. CONTRARY APPROACHES
The fact that Islamic financial institutions are formalist does not, however,
end the inquiry per se. Vogel and Hayes, the authors of the authoritative work
on Islamic finance in the English language, argue that Islamic commerce as
currently practiced satisfies broad segments of Muslim society that are "socially
and politically conservative, seeking individual piety and social mores built
around traditionalist compliance with fiqh [Islamic law], and look[ing] to social
and political improvements mainly as a result of that."42 Timur Kuran, a wellknown critic of Islamic economics, points out that the central reason that these
financial institutions exist has much less to do with economic or commercial
sense than with a desire for a form of cultural distinctiveness.4 3 This objective
can certainly be achieved in a purely formal system.
Adding to this might be the fact that formalism presents no central
difficulty in most matters concerning ritual practice of the faith, and may even
be salutary. Returning to my earlier analogy, my father does not eat pork, yet, as
a medical doctor, he knows that there is no functional reason relating to health
or welfare that justifies his abstention. He is not seeking to avoid a disease or a
chemical addiction; he pretends no functionality in the rule. God, through
Revelation (as determined by the jurists), has prohibited the consumption of
pork. The benefit to be gained, in my father's opinion, is derived solely from
faithfully obeying the will of God.
My father is not alone. I have been to hundreds of Islamic butchers, and
nearly all sell "Islamic bacon" made from turkey, or "Islamic hot dogs" made
from chicken, advertised and designed to resemble, as closely as possible in
every way, their Islamically prohibited pork analogues in the broader market. In
their observance of dietary ritual, Muslims may at times point out the risk of
tapeworm in pork or its high cholesterol content, but the statements can hardly
be taken seriously. If asked about salmonella in chicken, the cholesterol in
certain cuts of beef, or the wisdom of prohibiting items containing pig enzymes
which carry neither tapeworm nor cholesterol, Muslims inevitably, and sensibly,
return to the Qur'anic verse on the consumption of pork and abandon any
functional position.
Moreover, particular social benefits may arise from the strict formalism. As
I mentioned earlier, Mary Douglas points out the strengthening of the bonds of
a community through the mutual observance of a precisely and formally defined
42

Vogel and Hayes, Islamic Law and Financeat 27 n 2 (cited in note 23).

43

Timur Kuran, Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicamentsof Islamism 101-02 (Princeton 2004).
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ritual." These benefits could not arise if the formal rituals and rules were subject
to continual change by parts of the community on the basis of some sort of
external functional analysis.
B. INAPPLICABILITY OF FORMALISM IN FINANCE
As valid as some of these considerations might be, they are entirely
misplaced when applied in the financial sector, for the reasons set forth herein.
1. Hypocrisy
The most obvious problem with approaching Islamic finance in such
formalist terms is that its proponents never discuss it in this manner. Indeed,
they endlessly promote functional benefits to the formally derived rules, which
are by and large nonexistent. To cite only a few examples, Mohammed Taqi
Usmani, a former judge on the Shari'ah Appellate Bench of the Pakistani
Supreme Court and a major proponent of Islamic finance, indicates that the
charging of interest is partially responsible for the massive disparities in wealth in
capitalist societies.4" Umer Chapra, an economist at the Islamic Development
Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and one of the most well-known and most prolific
advocates of Islamic finance in the Muslim world, makes notions of social justice
central to his robust defense of Islamic finance.46 Muhammad Nejatullah
Siddiqui, a professor of economics in Saudi Arabia, opens one of his most wellknown books on Islamic economics with the sentence "[I]n prohibiting interest
Islam has endeavored to do away with a hideous form of tyranny and injustice
prevalent in human society." 47 Timur Kuran describes the prohibition of interest
as being "the most celebrated" injunction in Islamic economics among the
proponents of the discipline.48 According to Kuran, these proponents ground
the injunction on the principle of fairness.4 9
Muslims generally are captivated by this perception and are shocked when,
in seeking to obtain Islamic financing, they discover the ruse. I have more than
once fielded calls from angry Muslim congregation leaders in the United States
asking me to direct them to "real" Islamic financial institutions, as the particular
banks to which they went indirectly charged interest in their view, albeit in the
form of an elaborate and obfuscatory transaction. In addition, while serving as a
44

Douglas, Puriy and Dangerat 41-57 (cited in note 7).

45

Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to IslamicFinanceat 17 (cited in note 26).
See generally Umer Chapra, Towards aJust Monetagy System (Islamic Found 1985).

46

48

Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Banking without Interest 11 (Islamic Found 1983).
Timur Kuran, On the Nolion of Economic Justice in Contemporay Islamic Thought, 21 Intl J Nid E Stud

49

Id.

47

171,174 (1989).
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legal adviser to the Finance Committee of the Governing Council of Iraq, I
noticed several fellow members of the Committee expressing grave concern
over any financial law or regulation that might affect entities such as currency
exchange houses in addition to banks. It was not unusual for one or more of
them to remark that currency exchange houses were run by honest, God-fearing
Muslims less in need of regulation than conventional banks, which were hardly
to be trusted given the exploitative nature of their interest-taking business.
In light of this, suggestions regarding the propriety of formalism seem
secondary; few within the industry seem to be addressing the community in such
terms. Admittedly, however, this problem could simply be fixed with better and
more honest communication, and a frank admission that Islamic finance aspires
to be little more than mere formal compliance with doctrine. At present this has
not occurred, nor is there any indication that it will. This may be because
proponents of the current practice are aware that this information may well
doom the practice given the broader societal interests in an alternative form of
financial intermediation steeped in Islamic conceptions of fairness and social
justice.
In all likelihood, however, most proponents are not quite this manipulative
and instead engage in a delusion that some magical way will be found in the near
future for Islamic banks to adhere simultaneously to form and function. That
more than three decades have passed since the first modern Islamic bank was
founded, 0 and that the murabaha continues to dominate the practice, should be
evidence enough that this mythical convergence cannot possibly be achieved.
2. Nature of the Discipline
Finance is by its nature a functional affair. There is no requirement under
Islamic law that my father place his money in any sort of financial vehicle. He
could simply rent a safety deposit box, drop into it the entirety of his savings in
cash, and withdraw from it as he pleased. By choosing to deposit in a bank,
Islamic or otherwise, he is seeking some sort of functional gain, and clearly the
bank is doing the same by using those deposits to make investments of its own.
Financial institutions exist for functional reasons and it seems strange to
approach them in the highly formalist manner that modern proponents of
Islamic finance currently do.
Implicitly, the formalist approach suggests that the functional purposes of
the institutions are to be decided not by the broader Muslim community, nor the
jurists, nor the institutions themselves, but by the global commercial
marketplace, with the sole areas of Islamic distinction being purely formal.
Given the extent to which Islamic conservatives everywhere preach the
so
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importance of adhering to Islam as an all-encompassing way of life, the notion
that Islamic commerce should in terms of ultimate objectives mimic more
conventional forms of commerce is difficult to sustain.
Modern proponents of Islamic finance respond to these challenges in a
manner that seems to flirt with functionalism in proposed commercial practices
without adopting it. Usmani, for example, describes the murabaha as a
"borderline transaction," and insists that the underlying asset be a genuine one
intended to be used by the purchaser, not a fungible or synthetic product readily
resold.5' Others require the asset to be in the hands of the bank for some period
of time, though in practice, this can be, and often is, limited to one tenth of one
second or less with the contractual obligation of the purchaser having been
secured long before the bank purchases the product.5 2 Even Vogel and Hayes
seem to find it difficult to support the use of the synthetic murabaha where the
asset purchased is not used by the borrower at all."
Tawarruq remains even more
54
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These concerns are necessarily functional, but not sufficiently functional to
make any real sense out of the discipline. What purpose does it serve, for
example, to require a bank to own the fungible asset for one minute before
transferring it? Would it make a difference if fifteen minutes were to elapse
instead? How does the fact that the asset is to be used by the buyer-borrower
rather than immediately sold for its cash value prevent the type of
misdistribution of wealth that Usmani indicates is a result of the taking of
interest? If interest is a form of tyranny, why is the delayed sale of an asset at a
higher value reflecting a return equal to interest not equally tyrannical?
Answers to these questions seem impossible because the concerns
themselves are misplaced in the context of a formal discipline. It seems that
proponents of formalism are aware of the inherently functional nature of finance
and their mostly suppressed functional assumptions and presuppositions
therefore rise to the surface from time to time, but only in the oddest and most
misplaced ways. Having decided on a formalist course, it will not do to attempt
to inject functional principles at the end of the inquiry, when particular formalist
solutions seem especially transparent. Even the attempt lays bare a certain
incoherence at the heart of any endeavor to make an enterprise as functional as
commerce into a formal exercise.
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The functionalist assumptions of Islamic finance are shared by the broader
community as well. Islamic banks, for example, routinely hide the prevailing
market interest rates, such as LIBOR, that they use in their internal calculations
in the context of murabaha and other Islamically-acceptable transactions. Vogel
and Hayes explain that this is due to the fact that such figures might be
"mistaken" as an intention to take interest, but this hardly seems convincing.55
Islamic butchers do not shy away from the sale of turkey bacon on the grounds
that it might be "misunderstood" as pork; to the contrary, the meat is colored
artificially to resemble pork more closely. If Muslims at Islamic financial
institutions operated under the same expectations, the bank could simply
indicate that the reference to LIBOR reflects the bank's expected "asset salebased rate of return" or some similar cleverly developed term meant to indicate
that the return was based on LIBOR, but that formal interest was not charged.
The bank's embarrassment at such an explanation, or its expectation of
consumer anger, only demonstrates further the hopelessness of the formalist
endeavor.
3. Futility of the Enterprise
It is not even clear that Islamic financial institutions or any form of Islamic
finance or commerce would be commercially viable if it attempted to adhere to
formalist principles. The case of takaful makes this perfectly clear. One may
legitimately question whether "formalism" is even an accurate word to describe
the takaful; it appears to be more an exercise in incoherent semantic
reclassification than any genuine attempt to avoid through formal means a
central commercial prohibition. There is nothing that distinguishes takaful from
insurance other than its name; it would seem as sensible to permit a believer to
eat pork simply by calling it white beef.
Takaful is by no means the only example of an area in which Islamic
financial institutions fall short of the formal requirements of Islamic law. Under
formalist Islamic transactions operating today, lessees bear risks that they may
not bear under the formally developed rules of Islamic finance. Contracts that
must be cancelable at will often are not and variable return rates corresponding
to a shift in the interest rate are frequently included through a "renewable" lease
that parties are required by the contract to renew. All of this is handled readily
through agreements that reference New York or English law to ensure
enforcement, demonstrating better than anything how this system simply cannot
operate on its own.56
55
56

Islamic Law and Financeat 139 (cited in note 23).
Id at 144-50, 263; Umar F. Moghul and Arshad A. Ahmed, ContractualForms In Islamic FinanceLaw
and Islamic Inv. Co. of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: A First

Vol. 7 No. 2

JurisrudentialSchizophrenia

Hamoudi

If there were some way
requirements, one would have
now, or at least to have begun
moving beyond formalism to

to develop the practice in keeping with formal
expected Islamic banks to have discovered it by
a convergence in this direction, rather than to be
semantic fantasy through "innovations" such as

the takafuL

C. THE POTENTIAL DEPOSIT
What then might a potential, pious investor such as my father achieve
through investing in an Islamic financial institution as currently developed? He
might believe, based on what he has read or heard, that he was depositing funds
with a bank that was functionally fairer and more socially just than one that took
interest. He might continue to believe this until he investigated the matter rather
exhaustively, given that the bank would characterize its transactions as profitsharing on the sale and purchase of assets. Moreover, the bank would not, to the
extent permitted by law, disclose any material or information that would give the
impression that it operated as "tyrannically" and "oppressively" as conventional
banks do.
Were this investigation undertaken, the methods of the bank might strike
him as improper, not only because he had been deluded by claims of social
justice, but also because Islamic banks should, in his view, be functionally
different in their operations. The bank might struggle to keep his business,
raising such substantive but functionally irrelevant differences as the fact that,
unlike a conventional bank, this bank had to purchase assets and sell them
seconds, minutes, or perhaps hours later. The bank would have a harder time
explaining why the choice of law clause selected New York law, particularly if
the transaction took place in a Muslim country.
All the while, the interest rates of the bank might be higher, and my
father's return lower, to compensate for transaction costs incurred in avoiding
interest. It is not difficult to see precisely why so many pious Muslims shy away
from the practice of Islamic finance given these formalist realities.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP
The other option is an overhaul of the formalist structure set forth in the
orthodox approach to jurisprudence and a recognition that outside of particular,
ritualized aspects of faith, formalism cannot continue to have the same hold
over the Muslim imagination. Instead, elements of equity, discretion, and public
Impression of Islamic Finance, 27 Fordham Intl L J 150, 189-90 (2003) ("Parties to Islamic finance
transactions often assert English or New York law as the governing law relying on the probability
that the contracts are more likely to be enforced as written.").
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interest require greater consideration through doctrines such as istibsan and
istislah. Clearly there is significant demand for the Islamic financial institution, as
evidenced by its explosive growth into an industry with assets in excess of $200
billion operating in over 70 nations and growing at an annual rate of over 20
percent per year.5 7 Yet without the increasingly difficult to maintain
understanding that Islamic finance is a functionally fairer and more socially just
alternative to conventional finance, so central to the conception of Islamic
finance among Muslims, it is unclear that the industry can continue to expand,
or indeed even keep those who have already invested their funds in it. There is
already evidence that many Muslim investors eschew Islamic banks precisely for
and failure to articulate a meaningful alternative to
their excessive formalism
8
conventional finance.
What would such a functional Islamic financial institution look like? I
identify three key components, as described below.
First, Islamic finance must recognize commercial necessity. By this I mean
that functional Islamic banks redevelop the prohibitions on niba and gharar so
that they no longer cover vital commercial activities in which any bank must
engage in order to be commercially viable. A failure to do this merely forces the
bank to observe formal prohibitions and utilize valuable resources to circumvent
them that could better be used elsewhere.
Second, Islamic finance must remain centered around fairness and social
justice. If Islamic jurisprudence simply rendered irrelevant the historic niba and
ghararprohibitions, this would hardly serve the Islamic public interest. It would
disregard the populist demands for an alternative form of finance that gave rise
to the practice of Islamic finance in the first place. Moreover, it would then be
difficult to understand what the purpose of an "Islamic" financial institution
would be given its stunning resemblance in that event to a conventional bank.
Finally, a functional approach by its terms should not involve the creation of
ways to subvert Islamic doctrine but rather should redevelop doctrine into more
practical use. Riba and gharar are real prohibitions meant to serve a functional
purpose, and they should do so.
Fortunately, there are ample examples of exploitative or highly speculative
gain that an Islamic bank can eschew in keeping with a functional jurisprudence.
The savings and loan industry collapse at the end of the 1980s was exacerbated
significantly as a result of federally insured savings institutions investing
excessively in highly speculative ventures.59 Stories abound of financial
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institutions offering credit cards and other forms of high-interest consumer debt
to individuals clearly without the capacity to pay them. There are various ways
banks can recast themselves to address such broader concerns. For example,
Professor El-Gamal has suggested that the banks adhere to the "spirit" of the
riba and ghararprohibitions by taking a mutual form.60 This would minimize the
necessity of high-risk, high-return, and potentially exploitative investments to
please shareholders seeking maximum profit.
Third, Islamic finance must avoid highly speculative financial products. If
the prohibitions in the Qur'an and the hadith banning games of chance and the
sale of uncaught fish in the sea are to have meaning, even in a limited fashion,
then there must be some sort of limitation on the level of speculation in which
an Islamic financial institution may engage. In particular, those types of activities
that are so speculative in nature as to resemble a "game of chance" prohibited by
the Qur'an might be suspect, particularly if they appear to lack a commercial
purpose. The precise contours of the doctrine would require refinement, but
quite clearly there is an Islamic preference for safer and more predictable
investments, and one would expect Islamic banks to adhere to such preferences.
V. CONCLUSION
If my father were to choose to invest in a functional Islamic institution that
adhered to the principles mentioned above, the institution's representatives
would inform him that it operated as conventional banks do: by charging
interest and engaging in some form of commercial risk including insurance.
However, they could quickly add that they did act in certain ways that
conventional banks would not and that an Islamic board approved each and
every one of the bank's investments to ensure that it met certain fairness
standards. Also, they could indicate that they shunned investments in financial
products that were so highly speculative as to approach a game of chance. The
institution in question might take a mutual form, so that my father and his fellow
Muslim investors were themselves the shareholders, eliminating the need to
attract and retain external shareholders through high profit levels. The
institution might also devote a specific portion of its portfolio to interest-free
loans to support local Islamic nonprofit ventures. Inasmuch as it failed to offer
rates of return that were entirely competitive with conventional banks, this
would be because of its dedication to principles which emphasize that
communitarian notions of fairness and social justice play as important a role as
profit in the commercial affairs of the pious.
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This would be, it seems, a desired outcome not only for potential investors
such as my father, but for the industry as well, if the rhetoric is to be believed.
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